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Using a spatial competition model of retail payment networks, this paper 
discusses the likely economic consequences associated with the formation of the 
Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA). The model considers an expansion of 
positive network externalities on the demand side and adjustment cost on the 
supply side and reveals that the introduction of SEPA may not lead to a fully 
competitive and integrated retail payment markets. This is especially the case 
when the markets are segmented before the introduction of SEPA. In such a 
scenario, the post-integrated markets are likely to remain segmented or will be 
characterised by a kinked equilibrium where no significant price competition 
takes place. In both outcomes, SEPA leads to increased prices, larger network 
sizes (ie increased number of customers) and a higher consumer surplus. 
Additionally, if the SEPA-induced adjustment costs for payment networks are not 
prohibitively high, SEPA may also lead to an increase in both profits and social 
welfare. 
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Vähittäismaksujärjestelmien integraatio Euroopassa: 
analyysiä SEPAn vaikutuksista 
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 22/2008 
Kari Kemppainen 




Tässä tutkimuksessa analysoidaan yhtenäisen euromaksualueen, SEPAn, muodos-
tamisen vaikutuksia. Analyysivälineenä käytetään spatiaalisen kilpailun mallia, 
jota sovelletaan vähittäismaksujärjestelmien väliseen kilpailuun. Mallissa keskei-
siä SEPAn vaikutuskanavia ovat positiiviset kysyntäpuolen ulkoisvaikutukset 
sekä tarjontapuolen kiinteät sopeutumiskustannukset. Tulosten mukaan SEPA ei 
itsessään näyttäisi johtavan täysin integroituneisiin ja kilpailullisiin vähittäis-
maksumarkkinoihin, jos markkinat ovat kansallisesti segmentoituneet ennen 
SEPAa. SEPAn jälkeiset markkinat ovat edelleenkin segmentoituneet, tai niitä 
luonnehtii ns. polveikas tasapaino, jossa maksuverkkojen välinen kilpailu ei ole 
intensiivistä. Näissä molemmissa tilanteissa SEPA johtaa korkeampiin hintoihin, 
mutta myös maksuverkkojen koko (asiakkaiden lukumäärä) ja kuluttajan ylijäämä 
kasvavat. Jos lisäksi SEPAn aiheuttamat sopeutumiskustannukset eivät ole 
kohtuuttoman suuret maksujärjestelmien voitot kasvavat, jolloin myös 
kokonaistaloudellinen hyvinvointi paranee. 
 
Avainsanat: integraatio, SEPA, verkostovaikutukset, vähittäismaksut 
 
JEL-luokittelu: G21, L14, L15  
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The Single Euro Payments Area, SEPA, aims at creating one pan-European 
market for cashless retail payments in euro.
1 Current national retail payment 
systems will gradually migrate to SEPA from 2008 onwards. When completed, 
SEPA will have a huge influence on the European retail payments landscape: 
philosophically, it should do the same to non-cash retail payments what did the 
introduction of euro notes and coins to paying in cash. In this respect, SEPA can 
be seen as a natural progression to the introduction of euro and a further step in 
realising the full potential of the Single Market for Europe.
2 
  Given the topicality of the SEPA-initiative and its potentially far-reaching 
implications for the retail payment industry in Europe, it is somewhat surprising 
that analytical studies on its implications are almost non-existent. In the present 
paper, we aim to make a contribution to this rather unexplored area by providing a 
simple industrial organisation analysis on the implications of SEPA. Our research 
question is straightforward: What are the economic effects of SEPA? We study 
this question in a spatial competition model of retail payment networks. 
  When analysing the potential SEPA-effects, it is important to pay attention to 
the initial conditions prevailing before the SEPA-introduction. In Europe, national 
retail payment systems were originally created by individual banks and banking 
communities to meet national requirements for handling payments in national 
currencies and are thus functioning on the national standards. Accordingly, the 
current European retail payments landscape is fragmented and procedures, 
instruments and services offered to customers are nationally diversified resulting 
in no interoperability between national payment schemes. By requiring common 
standards and harmonisation of core payment schemes, SEPA aims to remove this 
fragmentation and lead to interoperability and compatibility. This should benefit 
consumers through more potential usage points of compatible SEPA payment 
instruments, and it is also likely to have implications on competition between the 
currently segmented national payment systems through increased interoperability. 
  At a very general level, the SEPA-process can be characterised as follows: 
before the introduction of SEPA, national payment networks operate on national 
standards with no cross-border interoperability and, therefore, these networks act 
local monopolies on their national markets. The introduction of SEPA results in 
forced compatibility and interoperability between networks through common 
SEPA-standards. To adopt the common standards, payment networks have to 
                                                 
1 SEPA covers the 27 EU countries, the other three European Economic Area countries (Iceland, 
Liechtenstein and Norway) and Switzerland. SEPA is an initiative by the European banking sector 
with the European Payments Council as its decision making and coordinating body, see 
www.europeanpaymentscouncil.eu. 
2 For policy issues and an extensive collection of related links, see the webpage of the European 
Central Bank: www.ecb.int/paym/sepa/html/index.en.html.  
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update their systems which induces them fixed adjustment costs. Given this 
generalized framework, we construct a stylised spatial competition model of retail 
payment networks to illustrate and analyse the potential effects of the SEPA-
formation. The main emphasis is on the demand side network externalities that 
will expand when SEPA is introduced. 
  In reality, SEPA is a big and many-faceted undertaking as it comprises all 
major non-cash retail payment instruments: credit transfers, direct debits and card 
payments. Accordingly, full-scale modelling of its effects is very complicated as 
these payment instruments have inherent differences and a wide variety of 
different stakeholders are involved in the process. Therefore, we take a narrower 
view and focus on payment system level issues by building a generic model to 
describe the SEPA-formation. To fix ideas, our preferred interpretation of the 
model deals with the SEPA-effects in national debit card markets. We call these 
markets ‘payment cards markets’ where national debit cards are used along with 
cash. While the model abstracts many important institutional details of the 
payment card markets, our focus can be grounded by our aim to highlight the 
fundamental change SEPA is manifesting: ie effects of ‘forced’ cross-border 
interoperability and compatibility in the previously fragmented retail payment 
markets. For capturing these effects, the national debit card markets that are 
segmented before the introduction of SEPA can serve as a demonstrative 
example.
3 
  Our modelling of SEPA-formation can be summarised as follows. Before the 
introduction of SEPA, called Pre-SEPA period, consumers can use their payment 
cards only in their home network. After the introduction of SEPA, called Post-
SEPA period, consumers can use their payment cards both in home and foreign 
network. In other words, SEPA will bring ‘forced’ cross-border interoperability 
between the payment networks and thus expand consumers‘ network utility 
through compatibility.
4 For service providers, the introduction of SEPA induces a 
fixed adjustment cost for updating their systems to become SEPA-compatible (ie 
being able to accept each others’ cards). In this set-up, we apply a simple spatial 
competition model of payment card networks á la Hotelling and analyse the 
economic effects of the SEPA-formation by comparing prices, network sizes, 
profits, consumer surplus and total welfare in Pre- and Post-SEPA. To the extent, 
                                                 
3 In reality, the international card schemes, MasterCard and Visa, are already offering SEPA-
compatible cards. We nevertheless abstract them from our modelling as our focus is on the effects 
of SEPA-induced compatibility on the currently fragmented national payment systems. 
4 Our model has a real life counterpart by displaying many characteristics that resemble the EAPS-
initiative, the Euro Alliance of Payment Schemes. The EAPS is a joint initiative by the European 
Payment Schemes, enabling European cardholders and retailers to make card payments and cash 
withdrawals with payment cards across Europe’s national boundaries. The EAPS aims to develop 
into a new pan-European card payment scheme based on the national schemes and their 
infrastructures, and, hence, act as a competitor to the international card schemes. For more 
information on the EAPS, see their homepage www.card-alliance.eu.  
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the issues related to compatibility and adjustment costs are relevant to other 
SEPA-instruments, credit transfers and direct debits, we also hope to provide 
some insights into the effects of SEPA on these instruments as well. 
  We find that the introduction of SEPA does not lead to the fully-competitive 
and integrated retail payment markets if the Pre-SEPA markets are segmented (ie 
payment networks are local monopolies). Instead, the Post-SEPA markets also 
remain segmented or are characterized by kinked equilibrium. Where no 
significant price competition between payment networks takes place. In both 
cases, SEPA leads to increased prices, larger market sizes and higher consumer 
surplus. Moreover, if the payment networks’ SEPA-adjustment costs are not 
prohibitively high, SEPA also increases profits and social welfare. Accordingly, 
our results suggest that the overall effects of SEPA can be positive. 
  The rest of the study is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the related 
literature. Section 3 presents the model and derives equilibria in the Pre- and Post-
SEPA phases. It also defines the relevant parameter ranges for our SEPA-analysis. 
In Section 4, the analyses of SEPA-effects are carried out. Section 5 discusses 
limitations and possible extensions of the model. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2 Literature  review 
At a general level, our model is related to network economics literature analysing 
network externalities and their implications. Beginning with the work of Farrell 
and Saloner (1985) and Katz and Shapiro (1985) (see Economides (1996) for a 
survey), there is large literature on the advantages related to large networks when 
consumers value being in the same network as other consumers. As retail payment 
industry can be viewed as a network industry, our model set-up builds on the 
basic principles of network economics.
5 In the SEPA-context, the expansion of 
positive network externalities for consumers through wider compatibility of 
payment instruments is important, and this network industry aspect is 
incorporated in our model. In our analysis, compatibility forced by SEPA is taken 
as ‘mandatory’ so that strategic standardisation and compatibility decisions 
commonly analysed in the literature are not dealt with. 
  Our model is also related to the literature on network competition utilising 
spatial models. Starting from the seminal works by Laffont et al (1998a, b) and 
Armstrong (1998), there is a vast literature on network competition in 
communication and other ICT-industries. In this literature, competition between 
the two horizontally-differentiated and interconnected networks is analysed by 
                                                 
5 Network effects in payment systems have been discussed and analysed eg in McAndrews (1997) 
and Milne (2006). Kemppainen (2003) provides a general survey of network issues in retail 
payment systems.  
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applying the Hotelling model of consumer choice. As there are inherent 
similarities between communication industry and payment industry, we also 
model network effects utilising similar type of spatial competition framework. In 
this respect, our framework has similarities to eg Mason (2000) who analyses 
competitive Internet pricing using the Hotelling model. Regarding retail payment 
systems, spatial competition models have been used eg in analysing ATM 
network compatibility (see Matutes and Padilla, 1994, for a seminal paper on the 
factors influencing banks’ decision to share ATMs; and for a review of literature, 
see McAndrews, 2003). 
  Naturally, the literature on two-sided markets is very relevant for retail 
payment systems (for recent overviews, see eg Armstrong, 2006, and Rochet and 
Tirole, 2006). Models of two-sided markets are especially relevant in the payment 
card industry for studying the impact of interchange fees on user fees and volumes 
in payment networks.
6 Traditionally, this literature has analysed a single payment 
system case. Only recently, the case of competing payment systems has been 
studied by very few papers: Chakravorti and Roson (2006), Guthrie and Wright 
(2007), and Rochet and Tirole (2007). These papers have begun to give insights to 
a realistic situation where several payment systems compete and consumers have 
the choice between several non-cash payment instruments. 
  While recognizing the importance of the two-sided nature of retail payment 
systems, our modelling nevertheless abstracts from it as our ambition is limited to 
analyse SEPA-induced interoperability and compatibility at a more general 
payment network level. In other words, we view retail payment industry as a 
traditional network industry and study the economic effects of forced 
compatibility in the markets that are initially segmented. In this sense, our general 
framework resembles the example Rochet (2007) uses to demonstrate the impact 
of horizontal integration in a network industry. By applying a fully-covered 
market Hotelling model, he shows that mergers can benefit simultaneously firms 
and consumers in network industry. He argues that this is because positive 
network externalities increase with the size of the network, and play on the 
demand side a role similar to increasing returns to scale on the supply side. 
  Analytical literature related directly to our research question on the SEPA-
implications is very scarce. To our knowledge, there only exists a 
contemporaneous work by Schaefer (2008) that formally analyses SEPA-effects. 
Schaefer uses a model of spatial bank competition to evaluate the economic 
effects of SEPA-formation. He focuses on the payment system in one country 
(other country assumed to be symmetric) and applies a fully-covered market 
Hotelling model where there are two banks located at the both ends of the unit 
                                                 
6 The literature on two-sided markets is relevant for analysing those payment instruments where 
one group of participants are payers and another group payees: eg cards and direct debits for 
consumer to retailer payments. It is likely to be less relevant for credit transfers where payers and 
payees cannot be so divided.  
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interval and consumers having unit demands for bank transactions are evenly 
distributed between them. In this framework, Schaefer evaluates the SEPA-regime 
with high initial investment cost against status quo regime with low initial 
investment cost and also considers cross-border competition among banks through 
an entry by a foreign bank. He concludes that potential welfare enhancing 
channels of SEPA, like cost reductions for cross-border transactions and higher 
efficiency due to more cross-border competition among banks, seem to be fairly 
ineffective as the share of cross-border transactions is small and cross-border 
competition in retail banking is low. Accordingly, he argues that expectations 
about the positive effects of SEPA may be exaggerated as most channels for 
enhancing social welfare seem rather weak but the SEPA-project maybe worth 
undertaking, if the cost of creating SEPA-compliant systems is reduced by 
extending the time frame for its implementation phase. 
  Our model can be seen complementary to the work of Schaefer: we also apply 
Hotelling model to study SEPA-effects, but certain differences can be detected. 
The main difference is that in our model there are two payment networks located 
in two countries and our starting point is segmented retail payment markets, 
whereas Schaefer’s analysis focuses on one country (effects assumed to be similar 
in other country by symmetry) and fully-covered markets. In our approach 
involving explicitly two countries,
7 the segmented markets assumption is used to 
reflect the real-life initial conditions prevailing before the introduction of SEPA, 
ie the fragmented retail payment landscape in Europe. In addition, Schaefer 
analyses the SEPA-effects concentrating on the cost issues on the supply side, 
whereas our model focuses more on the demand side by introducing an expansion 
of positive network effects due to SEPA, and the supply side gets only a limited 
attention in the form of fixed SEPA-adjustment costs. Given our emphasis on the 
traditional network nature of retail payment systems, the main goal of our study is 
to analyse economic effects of SEPA-formation when compatibility and 




                                                 
7 For similar reasons, segmented/partially-covered  market Hotelling model applications have been 




3.1  Structure of the model 
We develop in this section a Hotelling-type model with unit demand and overall 
positive network effects to examine the potential economic consequences 
associated with the formation of SEPA. In our model, we view retail payment 
systems as traditional network industry. This allows us to study the effects of 
SEPA-induced compatibility on retail payment markets in a tractable way. As 
pointed out earlier, we focus on the effects of the SEPA-formation at the general 
retail payment system level and use national debit card networks (called as 
‘payment card networks’ hereafter) as demonstrative examples. Therefore, our 
model abstracts from the two-sided market literature that is undoubtedly very 
relevant in more comprehensive analysis of payment card industry. 
  The general structure of our model can be described as follows. We consider 
horizontally-differentiated payment card networks in two countries. These 
networks are owned by card issuers and acquirers that in practice are mainly 
banks. We do not model issuing and acquiring banks explicitly so we can think 
that payment cards are issued by the payment networks. Consumers are uniformly 
distributed along a Hotelling line with two payment card networks located at the 
two extremities of the segment [0,1]. Consumers have unit demands for payment 
cards and cash is assumed to be their alternative payment method. We also 
assume that consumers have a perfect foresight and can thus correctly anticipate 
how many consumers will be subscribing each payment card network. This 
perfect foresight assumption helps to circumvent the multiple equilibria problem 
(see eg Shy, 2001, or equivalent concept of ‘fulfilled expectations equilibrium’ 
used in Katz and Shapiro, 1985). Next, we present the main building blocks of the 





A consumer, who is located at xi possessing a payment card from network 1, has 
the following utility function, and respectively, for a consumer located at xj 
possessing a payment card from network 2 
 
k N N tx p V ) x ( U 2 1 i 1 i 1 ε + ε + − − =  (3.1a) 
 
k N N ) x 1 ( t p V ) x ( U 1 2 j 2 j 2 ε + ε + − − − =  (3.1b) 
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where V denotes a base utility or a basic value of having a payment card. V could 
represent the ‘convenience value’ a payment card brings along when making 
purchases (no need to have the exact amount of cash in hand), or ‘security value’ 
(no need to keep large amounts of cash in the wallet). p1 and p2 stand for prices 
(annual fees) charged by payment networks 1 and 2. t > 0 is the differentiation 
parameter. t can be thought of representing traditional transportation/travelling 
costs, when the interval over which the consumers are distributed could be given a 
geographic interpretation (of distance between the two payment networks). 
However, other interpretations of why some consumers prefer payment network 1 
to payment network 2 or vice versa may also be given.
8 Following eg Mason 
(2000), ε is a positive network utility parameter measuring the strength of indirect 
network externality. N1 and N2 are the equilibrium sizes of networks (correctly 
anticipated by the consumers under perfect foresight assumption). Accordingly, 
εN1 and εN2 measure the indirect network utility: it is assumed that the 
cardholders get network utility based on the size of their card network so that 
bigger network size translates to more potential usage points for cards and hence 
more utility (ie the more consumers posses the payment card, the more merchants 
are willing to accept them). Finally, k is a measure of compatibility {0,1}, an 
indicator variable that determines whether the card can be used in other network 
or not: ie k = 0 indicates full incompatibility, and k = 1 full compatibility. The 
change in k captures the effect of SEPA-formation on the demand side in our 
simple model. 
  Before the introduction of SEPA, called Pre-SEPA, consumers can use their 
payment cards only in their home network and thus get network utility only from 
it. Accordingly, we set k  =  0 in (3.1) yielding the following Pre-SEPA utility 
functions 
 
1 i 1 i 1 N tx p V ) x ( U ε + − − =  (3.2a) 
 
2 j 2 j 2 N ) x 1 ( t p V ) x ( U ε + − − − =  (3.2b) 
 
After the introduction of SEPA, called Post-SEPA, consumers can use their 
payment cards in both home and foreign network and get respectively network 
utility from both of them. Accordingly, we set k  =  1 in (3.1) yielding the 
following Post-SEPA utility functions 
 
2 1 i 1 i 1 N N tx p V ) x ( U ε + ε + − − =  (3.3a) 
 
1 2 j 2 j 2 N N ) x 1 ( t p V ) x ( U ε + ε + − − − =  (3.3b) 
                                                 
8 The parameter interpretations are discussed in Section 5, where also potential SEPA-effects on 
them are considered.  
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For our SEPA-analysis, we make the following two assumptions that will hold 
throughout the paper 
 
Assumption 1.  ε − ≤ t V  
Assumption 2.  ε > 2 t  
 
Assumption 1 ensures that the Pre-SEPA markets are segmented to correspond to 
the real life situation. It requires that the base value of a payment card must be 
smaller than ‘effective transportation cost’, the difference between the 
transportation cost and network utility parameters. 
  Assumption 2, in turn, ensures that the Post-SEPA network sizes are positive. 
It requires that transportation cost parameter is twice as large as the network 
utility parameter. The assumptions will become clearer in the subsequent sections: 





The supply side is very simple. The two payment networks are assumed to 
maximize their profits. For simplicity, it is assumed that their production costs are 
zero. Accordingly, their profits can be written as follows 
 
Pre-SEPA:  i i i x p = π  (3.4) 
Post-SEPA:  a x p i i i − = π  (3.5) 
 
where a is fixed adjustment cost for service providers as they have to upgrade 
their systems for SEPA-compatibility (ie being able to accept each others’ cards). 
 
 
3.2 Pre-SEPA  phase 
Before the introduction of SEPA, it is assumed that the payment card markets are 
segmented meaning that the two card networks located at the two extremities of 
the segment [0,1] are local monopolies.
9 In the segmented markets, besides 
payment card subscribers, there are also consumers, located around the center of 
the Hotelling line, who do not want to have a payment card. 
  In Pre-SEPA, consumers get network utility only from their home network. 
Let x1 denote a consumer who is indifferent of subscribing a payment card from 
                                                 
9 Assumption 1 defines the condition for Pre-SEPA segmented markets. It is derived at the end of 
this section.  
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network 1 and not having a card at all. Similarly, let x2 denote a consumer who is 
indifferent of subscribing a payment card from network 2 and not having a card at 
all. This means that consumers between 0 and x1 subscribe to network 1 (located 
at 0) while those between x2 and 1 subscribe to network 2 (located at 1). As we 
assumed that consumers are uniformly distributed on the Hotelling line, we have 
that the equilibrium size of network 1 is N1 = x1 and the equilibrium size of 
network 2 is N2 = 1–x2. Then we can write Pre-SEPA utility functions (3.2) as 
follows 
 
1 1 1 1 x tx p V U ε + − − =  (3.6a) 
 
) x 1 ( ) x 1 ( t p V U 2 2 2 2 − ε + − − − =  (3.6b) 
 
We assume that payment networks are symmetric and, in the following analysis, 
we focus on payment network 1. The results for payment network 2 can be 
derived similarly. 









1  (3.7) 
 
Here, the term t–ε measures ‘the effective transportation cost’, ie the difference 
between the transportation cost parameter t and network utility parameter ε, which 
is positive by Assumption 2. 









1 1  (3.8) 
 
Profit maximisation yields the following equilibrium values for price, network 
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2
) t ( 2
V







ε − = π + =  (3.13) 
 
We can now also derive the condition for Pre-SEPA segmented markets 
established in Assumption 1. Limiting the equilibrium market size equation (3.10) 
to be at maximum ½, ie 
2
1




=  yields directly Assumption 1:  ε − ≤ t V . 
  This assumption sets the upper limit to the relation of payment card’s base 
value to the ‘effective transportation cost’. Because we have Pre-SEPA segmented 
markets as a starting point, Assumption 1 is important by determining the relevant 
parameter ranges for our analysis of SEPA-effects. 
 
 
3.3 Post-SEPA  phase 
After the introduction of SEPA, the payment card networks become interoperable 
and consumers can use their cards in both home and foreign networks and get thus 
network utility from both of them. In Post-SEPA, payment networks face an 
adjustment cost a for upgrading their systems to be SEPA-compatible, ie updating 
their systems so that they are able to accept each others’ cards. 
  In contrast to Pre-SEPA, where we had by Assumption 1 segmented markets 
as a starting point, in Post-SEPA, the market outcome is a priori not determined. 
Based on Salop (1979), Ireland (1987), and Economides (1984, 1988), we can 
establish three symmetric equilibria: (i) segmented market equilibrium (‘local 
monopoly’ or ‘partially-covered market equilibrium’), (ii) fully-covered market 
equilibrium (‘competitive’ or ‘duopoly equilibrium’) and (iii) kinked equilibrium 
(‘touching equilibrium’) depending on the parameter values.
10 
  Following similar steps as in Pre-SEPA case, the Post-SEPA utility function 
(3.3) can be rewritten as (again x1 and x2 refer to the ‘last indifferent consumers’ 
belonging to the network 1 and 2 and thus determining also the equilibrium sizes 
of networks) 
 
) x 1 ( x tx p V U 2 1 1 1 1 − ε + ε + − − =  (3.14a) 
 
1 2 2 2 2 x ) x 1 ( ) x 1 ( t p V U ε + − ε + − − − =  (3.14b) 
                                                 
10 We will show later that not all of them are relevant for our SEPA-analysis as we assumed Pre-
SEPA segmented markets as the starting point.  
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As in the Pre-SEPA case, we assume symmetric payment networks and, in the 
following analysis, we focus on payment network 1. From the Post-SEPA utility 
function (3.14), we get that a consumer located at x1 will obtain a payment card 
from payment network 1 if two conditions are met 
 




1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 x ) x 1 ( ) x 1 ( t p V U ) x 1 ( x tx p V U ε + − ε + − − − = ≥ − ε + ε + − − =  (3.16) 
 
Condition (3.15) refers to the Post-SEPA segmented markets where the marginal 
consumer is indifferent between obtaining a payment card from network 1 and not 
obtaining a payment card at all. Condition (3.16), in turn, refers to the Post-SEPA 
fully-covered markets where the marginal consumer is indifferent between the 
two networks. Conditions (3.15) and (3.16) are respectively equivalent to 
 
) 2 t ( t




ε − ε − −










≤      (Fully-covered markets)  (3.18) 
 
We can now use conditions (3.17) and (3.18) to yield the demand function of 
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1  (3.19) 
 
Given this Post-SEPA demand function, we follow Ireland (1987) and identify the 
different parameter ranges for the three symmetric Nash equilibria. More detailed 
derivations of the relevant equilibria needed in our SEPA-analysis are presented 




(i) Segmented market equilibrium 
 
In the segmented market case, (3.17) holds as an equality and when inserting it 
into (3.5), the profit is 
 
a
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ε − ε − −
= π  (3.20) 
 











1  (3.21) 
 






p1  (3.22) 
 
and equilibrium market size 
 
) t 2 )( 2 t (
V ) t (
x1 ε − ε −
ε −
=  (3.23) 
 
The right hand side of (3.23) is a second degree function of ε and t. In Appendix 
1, it is shown that only the smaller root of ε (and bigger root of t) is feasible. In 
order to ensure positive network market size, Assumption 2 requiring t > 2ε needs 
to hold indicating that transportation cost must be twice as large as the network 
utility parameter. 
  Segmented markets require that the network 1’s market size x1 ≤ ½, yielding 
the Post-SEPA segmented market condition 
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Accordingly, the above defined solution for segmented markets is feasible since 
) 2 t ( t
p p ) t ( Vt 2 1
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ε − ε − −




(ii) Fully-covered market equilibrium 
 
In the fully-covered markets case, with 
) 2 t ( t
p p ) t ( Vt
t 2
p p t 2 1 2 1
ε −

















= π  (3.24) 
 
Maximising (3.24) with respect to p1 and assuming symmetric pricing, the 
equilibrium price is 
 
t p1 =  (3.25) 
 




x1 =  (3.26) 
 
Providing now that 
2
1
) 2 t ( t
p p ) t ( Vt 2 1 ≥
ε −
ε − ε − −
, the above solution is consistent with 
the initial hypothesis of fully-covered market solution, and this condition is 






(iii) Kinked equilibrium 
 
Between the segmented and fully-covered market equilibrium, there exists a 
kinked equilibrium, where all consumers are served but no significant price 
competition takes place. In parameter values  ε − < <
ε −
ε




) t ( 2
t
t,  t h e  
kinked equilibrium
11 is a consistent solution with price equate 
2
1
) 2 t ( t
p p ) t ( Vt 2 1 =
ε −
ε − ε − −





V p1 − ε + =  (3.27) 
 
and market size is 
                                                 





x1 =  (3.28) 
 
Accordingly, for Post-SEPA markets we have established three possible equilibria 
in different parameter areas: 
 
•  Segmented market monopoly equilibrium: 
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Relevant parameter ranges 
 
We defined in Assumption 1 the condition V ≤ t–ε under which the Pre-SEPA 
markets are segmented. When combining this Pre-SEPA starting point condition 
to the above Post-SEPA equilibria conditions, we are able to determine the 
relevant parameter ranges for our analysis of SEPA-effects. It can be directly seen 
that the Assumption 1 rules out the Post-SEPA fully-covered market equilibrium. 
In fact, this is one of the most fundamental results we get from our analysis. This 
result suggests that in our model SEPA as such is not enough to lead to fully-
competitive and integrated retail payment markets. Full integration of the 
previously integrated retail payment markets would require eg an increase in V. 
  When having the segmented pre-SEPA markets as our starting point 1, we can 
establish the following two relevant parameter ranges for our SEPA-analysis 
 
Parameter range 1) 
) t ( 2
t
t V V 1 ε −
ε
− ε − = ≤  
Parameter range 2)  [] ε − = ∈ t V , V , V V 2 2 1  
 
In parameter range 1, both the Pre-SEPA and Post-SEPA markets are segmented, 
and in parameter range 2, Pre-SEPA markets are segmented and Post-SEPA 
markets are in kinked equilibrium. Next we can assess the effects of SEPA in 




4  Analysis of SEPA-effects 
4.1  SEPA-effects in parameter range 1 
We first look at the SEPA-effects in the parameter range 1: ie 
) t ( 2
t
t V V 1 ε −
ε
− ε − = ≤ . 
  In this parameter range, both the Pre-SEPA and Post-SEPA markets are 
segmented. Using (3.22) and (3.23), we get the Post-SEPA equilibrium profits, 
consumer surplus and welfare in the symmetric Nash equilibrium 
 
a
) t 2 )( 2 t (




ε − ε −
ε −
= π = π  (4.1) 
 
2
) t 2 )( 2 t (
V ) t (






ε − ε −
ε −




t 5 t 3
) t 2 )( 2 t (

















ε − ε −
ε −
=  (4.3) 
 
We can now assess the SEPA-effects by comparing the Pre- and Post-SEPA cases 
and establish the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1. When payment card markets are segmented in both Pre- and Post-
SEPA, the introduction of SEPA results in higher prices, network sizes, profits, 
consumer surplus and welfare when ignoring the SEPA adjustment costs for 
service providers. 
 
Proof. This can be verified by comparing the Pre- and Post-SEPA segmented 
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The underlying economic interpretation of this proposition is straightforward. The 
network effects in segmented markets equilibrium are equivalent to an increase in 
the base value of having a card, V, as there is a ‘fixed’ increase in the value of 
having a card when it becomes interoperable with the other network. Accordingly, 
the sizes of networks and consumer surplus as well as prices and profits all rise. 
  Moreover, we can find the threshold values for service providers’ SEPA 
adjustment costs, a, that maintain Proposition 1 
 
∏
S a  = a threshold value for service providers’ adjustment cost parameter a for 
positive profit change 
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Given the nature of fixed adjustment costs, the existence of these threshold values 
is rather trivial so we only note that 
∏ > S
W
S a a . Naturally, if 
∏ > S a a , the payment 
card networks would be making lower profits compared to Pre-SEPA, but given 
the ‘mandatory’ role of SEPA they would still have needed to do necessary 
SEPA-investments. Similarly, if the adjustment costs were even higher, ie 
W
S a a > , 
also the total welfare would be lower. 
  In the Post-SEPA segmented market case, the SEPA introduction results in 
higher prices, network sizes, profits, consumer surplus and welfare; for profits and 
welfare, an additional condition is that the adjustment cost a is below the 
threshold values 
∏
S a  and 
W
S a . In Post-SEPA, the number of consumers who are 
willing to have a payment card increases as they are able to get network utility 
from both networks and consequently the sizes of networks grow. Payment 
networks can charge higher prices and earn higher profits (provided that 
∏ < S a a)   
23 
in Post-SEPA as entry of new payment networks is not considered in the model. 
Despite the higher prices, consumer surplus increases as the network utility 
expands and covers both ‘grown’ networks in Post-SEPA. Provided that the 
SEPA-adjustment costs are not prohibitively high, also total welfare increases due 
to the higher consumer surplus and profits. 
  In addition, an interesting effect of the SEPA-formation is worth pointing out: 
the pricing decisions of two payment networks become interconnected in Post-
SEPA. This can be directly seen when looking at the reaction function in (3.21) 
























  Here the annual fees of the two networks are strategic complements, even 
though the Post-SEPA markets are still segmented. This is so because the network 
externality connects their demands, and, in this respect, the ‘interconnectedness’ 
between the payment networks inevitably increases with the SEPA-formation. 
 
 
‘Forced market integration’-case 
 
In the previous case, the introduction of SEPA led to the situation where the Post-
SEPA payment card markets were still segmented. However, if the political goal 
of SEPA is to have integrated markets, we can study if this could also be achieved 
in the previous set-up. When authorities would like to eliminate the segmentation 
of the markets in the parameter range 1, one plausible possibility, given the past 
EU regulatory actions in the pricing of telecommunications and retail payments 
(the Regulation 2560/2001), would be to implement a price regulation in order to 
ensure market coverage. In our model framework, this regulated price can be 
defined as the price that would make the consumer in the middle of the Hotelling 
line indifferent between obtaining a payment card or not. In terms of the 
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yielding the regulated price
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12 It should be noted that, although the regulated price (4.4) and the kinked equilibrium price (3.27) 
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We can now evaluate this ‘forced market integration’ -case against Post-SEPA 
segmented market case and establish the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2. If authorities would like to have fully-integrated payment card 
markets by imposing a price regulation, this would result in lower prices and 
profits, but larger market sizes, higher consumer surplus and welfare compared to 
the unregulated Post-SEPA segmented market case. 
 
Proof. This can be verified by comparing the ‘forced market integration case’ 
with the post-SEPA segmented market case, ie comparing (4.4)–(4.8) with (3.22), 
(3.23) and (4.1)–(4.3). 
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If authorities resorted to the price regulation to have integrated markets in the 
Post-SEPA phase, this would result in lower prices and lower profits but market 
sizes, consumer surplus and welfare would increase. In this case, the price 
regulation would be beneficial for consumers because of lower prices and larger 
network sizes, and consumer surplus would thus inevitably increase. Even though 
the profits of payment card networks would be lower, the total welfare would rise 
because the increase in consumer surplus could dominate. 
  Naturally, the above economic interpretation of the Proposition 2 should be 
viewed cautiously. Given our assumption of ‘two networks acting as local 
monopolies’, the regulated prices, lower than the unregulated prices freely chosen 
by monopolists, will surely increase consumer surplus and welfare. However, this 
assumes away a lot of important issues in the economics of regulation of 
monopolies: namely, how to ensure that incentives to improve efficiency and to 
invest are not excessively reduced. In addition, alternative authority tools, like 
measures to reduce barriers to entry are surely of relevance in practical authority 
considerations. Finally, the price regulation considered above should not be mixed 
up with the prevailing real-life Regulation 2560/2001 on cross-border payments in 
euro stipulating that the equivalent domestic and cross-borders payment must be 
priced similarly. Accordingly, the above ‘forced market integration -case’ 
regulation is stronger and differs from the Regulation 2560 as it sets a direct price 




4.2  SEPA-effects in parameter range 2 
We look next at the SEPA-effects in parameter range 2. In parameter range 2, 
Post-SEPA markets are in the kinked equilibrium where all consumers subscribe a 
payment card but the marginal consumer is indifferent between subscribing a card 
or not. We already established the kinked equilibrium prices and market sizes in 
equations (3.27) and (3.28). Utilising these, we can define the kinked equilibrium 
profits, consumer surplus and welfare in the symmetric Nash equilibrium as 
follows 
                                                 
13 For a partially related analysis and discussion on the need for authority regulatory intervention 
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As before, we can evaluate the SEPA-effects by comparing the Pre- and Post-
SEPA equilibrium values and establish the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 3. When payment card markets are segmented in Pre-SEPA and in 
kinked equilibrium in Post-SEPA, the introduction of SEPA results in higher 
prices, network sizes, profits, consumer surplus and welfare when ignoring the 
SEPA adjustment costs for service providers. 
 
Proof. This can be verified by comparing Pre-SEPA segmented markets and Post-
SEPA kinked equilibrium cases (and setting a to 0), ie comparing (3.9)–(3.13) 
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The underlying economic interpretation of this proof is similar to Proposition 1: ie 
network effects in the kinked equilibrium are equivalent to an increase in the base  
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value of having a card, V, as there is a ‘fixed’ increase in the value of having a 
card when it is interoperable with the other network. 
  As before, we can also find the threshold values for service providers’ SEPA 
adjustment costs, a, that maintain Proposition 3 
 
∏
K a  = a threshold value for service providers’ adjustment cost parameter a for 
positive profit change 
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K a a . Naturally, if 
∏ > K a a , the payment card networks would be making 
lower profits compared to Pre-SEPA, but given the ‘mandatory’ role of SEPA 
they would still have needed to make necessary SEPA-investments. Similarly, if 
the adjustment costs were even higher, ie 
W
K a a > , also the total welfare would be 
lower. 
  Also in the Post-SEPA kinked equilibrium case, the SEPA-introduction 
results in higher prices, network sizes, profits, consumer surplus and welfare when 
ignoring the fixed adjustment costs. When including the adjustment costs, an 
additional condition for increase in profits and welfare is that these costs are 
below the threshold values 
∏
K a  and 
W
K a . In the Post-SEPA kinked equilibrium 
case, the market is just covered and both payment card networks have half of the 
market. Compared to Pre-SEPA, consumers can get network utility from both of 
the networks. Therefore, even though the prices are higher in Post-SEPA, 
consumers benefit via increased network utility and consumer surplus grows. Also 
the payment networks’ profits are higher if the SEPA-adjustment costs are below 
the threshold value. Accordingly, total welfare also increases if the fixed SEPA-




5  Discussion and future research 
Our model analysed economic effects of SEPA-formation by applying a spatial 
competition model of retail payment networks. The model allowed us to examine 
the effects of SEPA-induced compatibility at the payment system level in a simple 
and tractable way: starting from Pre-SEPA local monopoly retail payment systems 
with no interoperability resulting into Post-SEPA interoperable systems due to 
compatibility standards.  Because of the ‘mandatory nature’ of SEPA, our model 
did not deal with strategic standardisation and compatibility decisions commonly 
analysed in the network literature. A further step to this direction could be to 
adapt models of strategic standardisation like eg Gandal and Shy (2001) who 
analyse governments’ incentives to recognise foreign standards and to form 
standardisation unions when there are potentially both network effects and 
conversion costs. Their three-country, three-firm spatial competition model could 
be modified to analyse also the formation of standardisation unions in the retail 
payments field, like SEPA in the European context. 
  Regarding the present model framework, we discuss next more thoroughly 
parameter interpretations and potential SEPA-effects on them. First, as in any 
spatial competition model, the interpretation of the differentiation parameter t 
plays an important role. In our analysis, we maintained the traditional 
interpretation: ie t measuring costs of travelling to obtain a payment card from 
payment networks located at the two extremities of the segment. When having 
this geographic interpretation, we are inclined to think that SEPA does not affect t 
because the travelling costs stay the same in both Pre- and Post-SEPA phases. 
Alternatively, when considering that t would measure the differentiation of the 
two payment cards as products, the formation of SEPA is likely to have an effect 
on it. In this case, the differentiation between the two payment cards can be 
thought to diminish in Post-SEPA as they can be used in both networks offering 
same services. In our framework, this would increase competition and reduce the 
likelihood that Post-SEPA markets remain segmented. In practise, however, other 
inherent differences, like language and culture aspects related to ancillary card 
services, could still play a role and make consumers to prefer their home country 
network.
14 
                                                 
14 A further possible interpretation of t could be related to the consumers’ preference of using 
different payment media. In this case, t could be thought of measuring ‘disutility of card over cash’ 
so that the consumers located around the center of the Hotelling line would strongly prefer cash in 
a symmetric way in both countries. Also in this case, SEPA would not affect t. This preference 
interpretation has, however, some drawbacks: eg why would a consumer who does not want to 
have a payment card from his home country network dislike even more the foreign card network in 
Post-SEPA? This interpretation would need to be complemented by eg the language or culture 
differences in order to be viable.  
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  Secondly, the formulation of network utility in our model was rather 
simplistic. It was assumed that the cardholders get indirect network utility based 
on the size of their card network so that bigger network size translates to more 
potential usage points for cards and hence more utility (the more there are 
consumers who have the payment card, the more merchants are willing to accept 
them). Concerning the network utility parameter, ε describing the strength of this 
indirect network externality, we assumed it to be the same in Pre- and Post-SEPA. 
In the case of payment cards, this can be thought to be realistic: cardholders’ 
network utility depends only on the acceptance of the cards at the points of sales. 
Therefore, the introduction of SEPA should not have an effect on ε. In the same 
vein, also the base utility of having a card, V, can be assumed to be the same in 
Pre- and Post-SEPA. In this case, it is natural that convenience value of the card 
(no need to have the exact amount of cash in hand for the purchase at the point of 
sales) or security value (no need to carry  excess money balances) do not change 
with the introduction of SEPA. 
  In sum, the above potential parameter interpretations (besides ‘the pure 
product differentiation’ interpretation of t) suggest that SEPA would not have an 
effect on them. Therefore, our results, derived treating the parameters t, V, and ε 
constant, should be reasonable. However, one could also think of other more 
versatile formulations of consumers’ utility, like eg in de Palma and Leruth (1996) 
where the consumers are differentiated in their willingness to pay for the network 
externality, or in Baake and Boom (2001) where the consumer’s evaluation of a 
product depends both on its inherent quality and on its network size. With these 
types of demand formulations, SEPA-effects are likely to become less 
straightforward. 
  In our present framework, we can also consider the potential SEPA-induced 
compatibility effects on other SEPA payment instruments. Recalling the general 
utility function (1) from Section 2 
 
k N N tx p V ) x ( U 2 1 i 1 i 1 ε + ε + − − =  
k N N ) x 1 ( t p V ) x ( U 1 2 j 2 j 2 ε + ε + − − − =  
 
where we had k as indicator variable for compatibility {0,1}: k=0 for Pre-SEPA 
incompatibility and k=1 for Post-SEPA full compatibility. We can briefly discuss 
how this generic framework would apply to other SEPA-instruments. In the case 
of national debit cards, Pre-SEPA full incompatibility and Post-SEPA full 
compatibility have real-life counterparts: in Pre-SEPA, national debit cards can be 
used only in home network; and, in Post-SEPA, in both networks. 
  Regarding direct debits, we can apply a similar type of reasoning: in Pre-
SEPA, consumers can make a direct debit contract only in their home country, 
whereas in Post-SEPA this possibility expands also to the foreign country. In  
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addition the indirect network utility could be thought to function in a similar way 
as in the payment card case: the larger ‘the network size of direct debit users’ (the 
more consumers have made direct debit agreements), the more debtors are willing 
to offer this payment instrument. Accordingly, at a general level the analysis for 
direct debits could be conducted in a similar way as we did with the national 
payment cards. Naturally, the institutional details of direct debit, like mandate 
handling, suitability of unit demand formulation etc., should be carefully 
considered but our basic philosophy of the expansion of positive network 
externalities due to the SEPA-induced compatibility seems to be applicable to 
direct debits as well. 
 Regarding  credit  transfers, the case is different as they could already be made 
cross-border even before the SEPA-introduction eg through correspondent banks 
or pan-European clearing house (and the Regulation 2560/2001 on cross-border 
payments in euro ensures the same pricing with domestic payments). SEPA 
brought nevertheless common standards for credit transfers as well. When 
considering credit transfers in terms of our modelling, we could think that the 
variable k for compatibility can take other values than zero and one, ie  [] 1 , 0 k∈ . 
For example, we could think that k  >  0 in Pre-SEPA (as credit transfers can 
already be made cross-border but with some inconvenience compared to domestic 
ones) and k  =  1 in Post-SEPA under common standards. This could be an 
interesting extension of the current model. Moreover, one could also try to better 
take on board the fact that network externalities associated with credit transfers 
are likely to be more like direct network externalities, eg in the style of network 
externalities á la Laffont et al (1998a, b). 
  Naturally, also the cost issues on the supply side are of importance. In our 
model, we deliberately left out production costs of payment card services besides 
the fixed SEPA-adjustment costs for service providers to update their system. 
Generally speaking, these costs can be high. Based on the consultant studies 
conducted, Schmiedel (2007) reports that SEPA-related investments for the 
European banking industry at the aggregate level range between 5.2 and 7.7 
billion euros. If these SEPA-induced costs are mainly costs related to updating the 
systems of service providers to become SEPA-compliant, these costs can be 
thought as ‘fixed adjustment cost’ as we did. Then relaxing the zero production 
cost assumption and adding marginal costs that do not change as a result of the 
SEPA-formation would not affect our results. 
  However, SEPA may also yield cost reductions if potential economies of 
scale can be realised. Bolt and Humphrey (2007) estimate card and other payment 
network scale economies for European payment systems and verify their 
existence. Their results indicate that substantial cost efficiency gains could be 
achieved if processing was consolidated across borders rather than ‘piggy-backed’ 
onto existing national operations. In our framework, consolidation was not dealt  
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with but, if declining marginal costs were included, ‘smaller scale’ cost reductions 
could have been achievable because of the growing payment network sizes as a 
result of SEPA. Obviously, reduced marginal costs due to SEPA would strengthen 
the potential positive effects of the SEPA-formation. Anyway, inclusion of these 
potential cost reduction considerations could be an interesting extension to our 
model. An alternative way to deal with cost issues could be eg to adapt Gandal 
and Shy (2001) framework and include conversion costs in the Pre-SEPA phase 
when payment networks operate under national standards in contrast to common 
retail payment standards in the Post-SEPA. 
  Finally, also the market structure of retail payment systems is of the essence 
when analysing the effects of SEPA. In our analysis, we wanted to have a set-up 
to correspond to the current fragmented European retail payments landscape. 
Therefore, we had the Pre-SEPA segmented retail payment markets as our starting 
point thereby determining the relevant parameter areas for our SEPA-analysis. 
Theoretically, all the other possible parameter ranges could also be analysed for 
the sake of completeness. Accordingly, we could relax our Assumption 1 (Pre-
SEPA segmented markets) and look at the SEPA-formation starting from other 
possible Pre-SEPA market configurations: ie kinked equilibrium and fully-
covered Pre-SEPA markets. In this paper, we concentrated only on the case close 
to the reality and we leave these extensions for future work. 
 
 
6  Summary and conclusions 
The formation of the Single Euro Payments Area is posing a big challenge to the 
current fragmented European retail payment systems. Undoubtedly, its potentially 
far-reaching implications on the retail payments industry offer important and 
topical research questions. In this paper, we applied a simple spatial competition 
model of retail payment networks to study the likely economic consequences of 
the SEPA-formation. The model focused on some key ingredients in the SEPA-
process: namely, i) the expansion of positive network externalities on the demand 
side and, ii) the SEPA-adjustment cost on the supply side. Given this stylised 
focus, we tried to find answers to a fundamental question in the SEPA-process: 
What are the economic effects when compatibility is forced into the retail 
payment markets that are initially segmented? We used the currently segmented 
national debit card markets as a demonstrative example in our analysis. 
  Some of our results are worth highlighting. Let us first consider the 
authorities’ view on the final SEPA goal 
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  ‘The Commission and the ECB see SEPA as an integrated market for 
payment services which is subject to effective competition and where there is 




When assessing this goal in the light of our results, the following can be said. If 
we have, corresponding quite closely to the real life situation, segmented Pre-
SEPA retail payment markets as starting point, we do not enter in our model set-
up into the competitive duopoly situation where retail payment markets are fully-
integrated and effective price competition takes place. In other words, our model 
suggests that SEPA as such is not enough to lead to full-scale integration of retail 
payment markets. Instead, the possible market outcomes in Post-SEPA were 
segmented markets or markets characterised by kinked equilibrium. 
  In both Post-SEPA segmented markets and kinked equilibrium cases, the 
introduction of SEPA resulted in increased prices, larger network sizes and higher 
consumer surplus, but also profits and welfare increased if the SEPA-adjustment 
cost for payment networks were ignored. Furthermore, we were able to find 
threshold values for these adjustment costs under which payment networks’ 
profits and total welfare would also rise. Accordingly, our results suggest that the 
overall effects of SEPA seem to be positive if the fixed SEPA-adjustment costs 
are not prohibitively high. 
  However, even though our model indicated that consumer surplus would 
always be higher in Post-SEPA, the resulting rising prices (annual fees in our 
model) could be problematic in real life. Consumers seem to expect lower prices 
as a result of the SEPA: a recent report
16 by the Dutch central bank argued that the 
most important reason for Dutch consumers to shift to SEPA debit card would be 
lower annual fees. The second most important reason was broader acceptance 
abroad which is in line with our model structure. Accordingly, it can be said that 
consumers do value the broader cross-border acceptance but the pricing issues 
seem to be even more important. In real life, the pricing issue can be crucial: for 
SEPA to become a success, it is the consumers as end-users who need to adopt the 
SEPA-payment instruments. In the extreme case, increased fees of payment 
instruments in Post-SEPA could have negative effects on the practical adoption 
decisions by consumers. 
  On the supply side, costs of SEPA have been under debate, and especially the 
payment service provider sector has emphasised their potential high magnitude. 
Admittedly, our modelling focused more on the demand side effects and potential 
cost issues on the supply side were given only a limited attention. Our model did 
not include production costs; we had only fixed adjustment costs payment 
                                                 
15 Joint statement by the European Commission and the ECB 4th of May 2006. 
16 Jonker and Kosse (2008).  
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networks face when updating their payment systems to become SEPA-compliant. 
These adjustment costs played only a trivial role in our model: we established 
threshold values for these costs under which profits and total welfare would be 
always higher in Post-SEPA. However, besides inducing fixed adjustment costs, 
SEPA can also have an effect on marginal costs. Studies have suggested that there 
exist significant economies of scale in the European retail payment systems. If 
these scale economies can be realised eg through consolidation, this would 
strengthen the potential favourable effects of SEPA-formation. 
  All in all, our simple model suggests that the overall effects of SEPA can be 
positive. Despite the higher prices consumers gain because of increased network 
utility, and also payment networks’ profits and social welfare increase if the 
SEPA-adjustment costs are not prohibitively high. Naturally, one should be 
cautious not to draw too definitive conclusions on the desirability of the SEPA as 
it is in reality very complex and many-faceted undertaking including many 
stakeholders in addition to payment networks and consumers focused on our 
model. In this sense, our model could only give a limited view on the potential 
economic effects of SEPA when emphasising the expansion of demand side 
network externalities and fixed SEPA-adjustment costs on the supply side. 
Accordingly, further research covering wider range of relevant aspects, like the 
better treatment of cost side, competition between payment instruments etc., on 
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In the Post-SEPA segmented market case, it can be shown that only the smaller 
root of ε is valid when Assumption 2, requiring t > 2ε, holds. 
  Based on the Post-SEPA equilibrium market size equation 
2
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= , the condition for Post-SEPA segmented markets is 
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  Assumption 2 requires that t > 2ε, ie  t
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= ε ,  which can be rearranged 
t 3 V 2 t 9 Vt 4 V 4
2 2 − > + − . 
 
  This inequality can be further examined by 
 
1) assuming that 2V–3t  >  0. Then by squaring both sides, we have 
2 2 2 ) t 3 V 2 ( t 9 Vt 4 V 4 − > + −  to yield  0 Vt 8 > , which always holds. 
2)  assuming  that  2V–3t < 0.  Then  t 3 V 2 t 9 Vt 4 V 4
2 2 − > + − , when 
0 t 9 Vt 4 V 4
2 2 > + − , which is always true as it reaches its minimum at 
V = 1/2t yielding to  0 t 8
2 > . 
 
Accordingly, this results in a contradiction to Assumption 2 (ensuring positive 
network sizes in Post-SEPA segmented markets) requiring  ε > 2 t . Therefore, we 
can conclude that only smaller root of ε is valid: 
4
t 9 Vt 4 V 4 t 5 V 2
2 2 + − − + −
= ε . 
  Following similar steps, it can be shown that only the bigger root of t is valid.  
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Appendix 2 
We can proof the existence of the kinked equilibrium by evaluating the first-order 
conditions for the Post-SEPA segmented and fully-covered markets equilibrium at 






K − ε + =  
 
We first look at the Post-SEPA segmented markets case and then the Post-SEPA 
fully-covered market case and finally show that undercutting is not profitable in 
the kinked equilibrium. As in the main text, we assume that payment networks are 
symmetric, and we focus on network 1. 
 
 
Post-SEPA segmented markets 
 
The constrained profit maximisation problem for Post-SEPA segmented markets 
can be written as follows 
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We want to show that  0 ) p ( f < , when evaluating it at 
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By rearranging and multiplying by  ) 2 t ( t ε −  that is positive by Assumption 2, we 
get 0 ) t 2 ( p Vt
K < ε − − , and when inserting the kinked equilibrium price 
K p i n ,  
we have  
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Accordingly, we can conclude that  0 ) p ( f
K < , when 
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case, optimal price is 
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Post-SEPA fully-covered market 
 
The constrained profit maximisation problem for Post-SEPA fully-covered 
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optimal price is 
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With linear transportation costs, an additional condition for the existence of the 
kinked equilibrium is that a network cannot capture its competitor’s entire market 
by undercutting. To prove that undercutting is not profitable, recall the utility 
functions (3.1) in the main text 
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Let us now assume that network 2 sets price 
K
2 p p = . If network 1 deviates to 
capture the whole market, a necessary condition for a consumer  1 xi =  to join 
network 1 is  0 ) 1 x ( U i 1 ≥ = . 
  Accordingly, a consumer  1 xi =  joins network 1, if 
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